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Abstract—This paper presents a security analysis of robust 
watermarking methods based on Schur decomposition in a general 
scenario. The security is defined as the difficulty to remove the 
watermark and to estimate the secrets used in the embedding 
process, supposing that the adversary possesses several 
watermarked digital contents. The theoretical analysis and 
extensive experimental results carried out prove that these 
schemes fail to secure the digital contents against malicious 
attacks. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Internet technologies and mobile services have 
significantly increased in the last decade leading to the problem 
of rightful ownership and copyright protection. Digital 
watermarking, which aims at addressing these concerns, is the 
process of embedding a secret mark into the digital content while 
preserving its fidelity [1]. For this purpose the hidden mark is 
called robust. Instead, a fragile mark is used for integrity and 
authentication assessment. Independently of their type, the 
marks can be detected (recovered) directly from the 
watermarked content and in some cases the host media is also 
necessary. 
Watermarking algorithms can be divided into two 
categories, namely those that work in the pixel domain [2, 3] and 
those that work in a transform domain, e.g., the Karhunen-Loève 
transform (KLT) [4], the Singular value decomposition (SVD) 
[5-12], etc. The Schur decomposition [13-18] is another domain 
that has been recently used for robust watermarking. These 
schemes show good performances in terms of robustness, 
capacity and imperceptibility. However, to our knowledge, the 
security of these schemes has not been investigated yet.  
In the last few years, watermarking security has become a 
new research field [19-24], which implies the existence of an 
adversary that wants to circumvent watermarking. The security 
analysis adopted follows a cryptanalytic approach: all of the 
parameters of the watermarking scheme are assumed to be 
public while the security relies only on a secret key which will 
be used for watermarking several digital contents. 
The key technical contributions of this study can be 
summarized as follows: 
• A security analysis of robust data-hiding schemes based 
on Schur decomposition is carried out. 
• An attack is devised which takes into consideration the 
amount of information available to the attacker. In the 
first instance, it aims to remove the watermark by 
assuming that the block size is known, while in the 
second scenario the attack drops this assumption and 
tries to estimate it. 
The outline of this paper is as follows: in the next section, 
the Schur decomposition is introduced while in Section 3 we 
review the most representative Schur-based watermarking 
algorithms. Section 4 presents several attack scenarios, while 
experimental results and concluding remarks are given in 
Sections 5 and 6, respectively. 
II. SCHUR DECOMPOSITION 
The Schur decomposition is a factorization method applied 
to square matrixes similar to the singular value decomposition 
(SVD). Given a real square matrix  of size n×n the Schur 
factorization of A is given by: 
Schur(A) =                        (1) 
where  is an upper triangular matrix with the eigenvalues 
of A along the diagonal and  is a unitary matrix, that means     	, with its columns represented by the Schur 
vectors. If A is a positive definite matrix, its Schur 
decomposition and its singular value decomposition coincide. 
Compared to the SVD transform, the use of Schur 
decomposition for data hiding is limited since a Schur 
factorization exists only for square matrices. An interesting 
property of the Schur decomposition that is extensively 
exploited by the watermarking schemes is the ‘stability’ of the 
Schur vectors [13]. In particular, the relationship between the 
coefficients of the first Schur vector of matrix U is to have 
closely related values, that are able to survive to common signal 
processing attacks [13-16]. Furthermore, the coefficients can be 
perturbed without significantly damaging the content fidelity. 
The genesis of this idea comes from several observations [8-10] 
that hold for the SVD transform. 
However, this assumption was tested on a small dataset of 
natural images [13] that is insufficient to draw any statistically 
relevant conclusion. For instance, in order to test this assumption  
TABLE I.  THE AVERAGE NCC VALUE BETWEEN THE FOUR COEFFICIENTS OF THE FIRST SCHUR VECTOR FOR THE UCID IMAGE DATABASE. THE VALUES 










0.9868 0.9720 0.9624 0.9996 0.9760 0.9903 
[13] 0.8931 0.8771 0.8754 0.9672 0.9466 0.9575 
we selected 1338 grayscale images, taken from the UCID 
collection [25], and split them into non-overlapping blocks of 
size 4×4 pixels. Then, for each block we computed the 
normalized cross-correlation (NCC) between the coefficients of 
the first Schur vector. The average results obtained, together 
with the one reported in [13], are given in Table I. Similar to 
what has been reported in [13], i.e., “… u2,1 and u3,1 are the 
closest elements” of the first Schur vector, our results clearly 
confirm that the highest correlation obtained was obtained 
between u2,1 and u3,1 for the UCID datasets. 
III. SCHUR-BASED WATERMARKING 
Recently, several Schur-based image watermarking methods 
for copyright protection have been proposed [13-18]. Depending 
on the Schur features selected to store the watermark, these 
methods can be divided into two categories: 
• Eigenvalue-based, which insert the watermark into the 
diagonal elements of the matrix S using an additively 
(multiplicatively) rule or quantization-based [14-18]. 
• Vector-based, that hide the watermark bits into the 
Schur vectors [13]. 
In general, the former schemes require the original host 
content in order to detect the watermark, which limit their 
applicability. Moreover, their security issues are similar to those 
of the SVD-based schemes which have been extensively studied 
in [5].  
Instead, the latter schemes do not require any additional 
information to detect the watermark and, to our knowledge, their 
security has not been investigated yet. For instance, in [13] each 
color channel (i.e., RGB) of the host image is split into non-
overlapping blocks of size 4×4 followed by the Schur 
decomposition. Then, in order to insert the watermark bits 
several coefficients of the first Schur vector are modified using 
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where u2,1, u3,1 are the original coefficients and  , (  are the 
watermarked ones, 12 is the sign operator, || is the modulus, 
bi,j represents the bit of the encrypted watermark w, T denotes 
the embedding threshold and uavg is the average value of u2,1 and 
u3,1. Basically, depending on the encrypted watermark bit, the 
values of u2,1, and u3,1 are modified such that their difference is 
exactly T. Higher values of T yield more reliable detection, less 
security, and potential watermark visibility. The color 
watermark image encryption is done by shuffling its pixels with 
the Arnold transform followed by the binarization operation. 
The number of shuffling rounds is given by a secret key k. Note 
that this procedure does not increase the security of the 
embedded bits, i.e., making them more difficult to remove.  
Each encrypted watermark bit is recovered, without the aid 
of any auxiliary information, using the following extraction rule: 
                         
$4  ) 56778 9 (8$4  ' 56778 : (8    (3) 
where $4 denotes the recovered bit of the extracted encrypted 
watermark ;8 . In order to detect the presence of the watermark 
in an image, the extracted watermark is compared with the 
original one. 
IV. THE PROPOSED ATTACK 
In general, the common signal processing attacks aim to 
remove the watermark by globally perturbing the watermarked 
content. These attacks do not take into account the details of the 
watermarking method. Instead, the proposed attack tries to 
exploit the details of the watermarking method based on Schur 
decomposition and to use them to perturb only the features 
conveying the watermarking bits.  
To achieve this goal we need to apply a specific perturbation 
to the coefficients of the Schur vectors. The unknown 
parameters of [13] are the embedding threshold T, the secret key 
k, the block size and the selected coefficients of the Schur 
decomposition. 
Algorithm 1. Remove the hidden bits from the watermarked 
image Iw. 
Input: Iw, the block size and the selected coefficients of the first 
Schur vector in each block. 
Output: Attacked image, Iwa, which does not contain the 
watermark. 
1) Split Iw of size n×n pixels into non-overlapping blocks of 
size 4×4 pixels. The total number of blocks is nb = n/4×n/4. 
2) FOR i = 1 to nb 
3)   Apply Schur decomposition the block Bw(i) 
4)                     Schur[Bw(i)] =    
5)   Obtain the watermarked Schur coefficients ( , ( )              
6)   IF (  > ( ) 
7)            ( , (  (   
8)   ELSE 
9)           (   ,     
10)   END IF 
11)   Reconstruct the attacked image block: 
12)                       Bwa(i) =   
13) END FOR 
14) Reconstruct Iwa by combining all attacked blocks. 
The attack rule (Steps 6 - 9) aims to perturb one of the 
coefficients such their difference becomes equal to zero. In this 
way, the Su et al. [13] extractor will wrongly classify most of 
the hidden bits, failing to recover the watermark.  
If the block size is not available during the attack we can 
estimate it through a searching process. It is worth to point out 
that the embedding rule given in Eq. (2) does not preserve the 
unitary property of the Schur vector, i.e.     	. This is 
one of the major causes of range overflow and of the inability to 
perfectly extract the embedded watermark even when the host 
image has not undergone any perturbations. 
Another consequence of Eq. (2) is that it also affects the 
statistical distribution of the Schur coefficients. For the “clean” 
coefficients their values are in the range [1, 1] and the 
difference between a pair of coefficients can be approximated by 
a normal distribution, i.e., N(m, ), with m = 0.0049 and  = 
0.1126. Instead, the distribution of the difference between the 
watermarked coefficients defined as: 
<  +,+ * +(,+    (4) 
has two peaks, one for each of the watermark possible values, 
{0, 1}.  
Therefore, for each block of Iw, by computing Dw we can 
figure out the block size and the chosen coefficients used during 
the watermarking process. We tested this assumption for all the 
watermarked images of the UCID database, with the block size 
of 4×4 pixels. In Fig. 1 we report three cases: Dw for no-
watermark (i.e., difference between “clean” coefficients), and 
Dw for the watermark inserted using T = 0.01 and T = 0.02.   
It is interesting to note that for low values of T (that increase 
the invisibility of the watermark) the distribution of Dw does not 
follow the same pattern and we fail to estimate the block size 
and the selected coefficients. However, lower values of T do not 
provide a reliable extraction and robustness against signal 
processing attacks forcing the content protector to increase the 
embedding threshold. 
The last important observation that we can infer from Fig. 1 
is that also T can be accurately estimated from the distribution 
of Dw: the two peaks are centered on very close to the values -T 
and T, respectively, depending on the inserted bit. For instance, 
for the case of the watermark inserted with T = 0.02, the peaks 
are centered on the values 0.0197 and 0.0197. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
This section presents the experimental setup and the results 
of the proposed attack against the Su et al. [13] watermarking 
scheme. The 1338 images used in the experiments are all 24bpp 
color images of size 512×512 pixels taken from the UCID 
database [25]. For the watermark, we used a logo 24bpp color 
image of size 128×128 pixels. The quality of the watermarked 
image is measured using Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) 
and Structural Similarity index (SSIM) [26]. The structural 
index, which is calculated on various windows of an image, 
better assess the level of the distortion and of the quality 
perceived by a human. The SSIM index is a real value between 
1 and 1, being 1 for two identical images. The similarity 
between the original watermark, w, and the recovered 
watermark, wr, is measured by means of normalized cross-
correlation NCC defined as: 
=>>,?  ∑ ∑ ∑ ABCDCE0F ⋅AB?H∑ ∑ ∑ AB-CDCE0F ⋅H∑ ∑ ∑ AB?-CDCE0F
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.  (4) 
The parameters of Su et al. [13] watermarking scheme were 
set to the following values: T = {0.004, 0.01, 0.02}, block size 
4×4 pixels, and k = 3. Increasing the embedding threshold T 
lowers the quality of the watermarked images but increases the 
ability to recover the inserted watermark.  
It is worth to point out that the scheme is unable to 
completely recover the watermark. This is mainly due to 
rounding errors that occurs when reconstructing the 
watermarked image from the Schur domain to pixel domain 
[27]. We choose to apply the proposed attack on the 
watermarked images obtained with the embedding threshold T = 
0.01, since it gives the best trade-off between the invisibility, 
robustness and security of Su et al. [13] scheme. The results for 
NCC and, the PSNR and SSIM between the host/watermarked 
image and the attacked ones are presented in Table II. 
Figure 1.  Example of the embedding threshold T can be detected during the 
searching process. The histogram of the absolute difference, Dw, between the 
coefficients 2,1;  and 3,1;  for different cases: no watermark (blue solid line), 
and inserted watermark with T = 0.01 (green dotted line) and T = 0.02 (red 
dotted line). For a better visualization we restricted the values of Dw to the 
interval [0.4, 0.4]. The block size was of 4×4 pixels. 
 
TABLE II.  THE VALUES OF SSIM, PSNR AND NCC AFTER EMPLOYING 
THE PROPOSED ATTACK ON “LENA” AND “BABOON” IMAGES, AND ON UCID 
DATABASE. FOR THE UCID DATABASE THE AVERAGE VALUES, TOGETHER 
WITH THEIR ASSOCIATED STANDARD DEVIATIONS, ARE REPORTED. 
WATERMARKED IMAGES ARE OBTAINED WITH THE EMBEDDING THRESHOLD T 
= 0.01. IWA IS THE ATTACKED IMAGE.   
Metric Lena Baboon UCID 
SSIMIo,Iw 0.982 0.940 0.978P0.086 
SSIMIo,Iwa 0.989 0.946 0.097P0.093 
SSIMIw,Iwa 0.991 0996 0.098P0.096 
PSNRIo,Iw (dB) 37.66 27.57 33.15P3.2 
PSNRIo,Iwa (dB) 37.32 27.58 33.06P3.3 
PSNRIw,Iwa(dB) 41.68 40.94 35.97P3.2 
=>>,?  -0.018 -0.007 -0.002P0.005 
Although the host image is unavailable during the attack, we 
use it to better assess the invisibility of the attacked image. For 
the “Lena” and “Baboon” images the attack generated images 
with high quality, i.e., PNSR above 40 dB and SSIM above 
0.990, while completely removing the inserted watermark, i.e., 
NCC below 0.02.  
Similar results have been obtained for the images belonging 
to UCID database. The average PSNR and SSIM values for the 
attacked images were lower since it was mounted on the 
watermarked images with a lower quality. This is due to the fact 
that Su et al. [13] embedding threshold is fixed and the 
embedding algorithm does not take into consideration the human 
visual system [1]. For the UCID database, the maximum values 
of SSIM, PSNR and NCC obtained were 0.997, 42.68 dB and 
0.0245, respectively. 
The PSNR between the watermarked image and the attacked 
image is 41.68 dB for the “Lena” image and 40.94 dB for the 
“Baboon” image. It means that the quality of the attacked image 
is very good leaving no traces of artifacts visible to human visual 
inspection.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper an attack to the watermarking schemes based 
on Schur decomposition is designed. In particular, the attack has 
been applied on a recently proposed algorithm [13]. We 
successfully removed the watermark by exploiting the traces left 
by the embedding rule.  
Specifically, these traces enable us to identify, from several 
watermarked contents, the secret parameters of the 
watermarking scheme, i.e., the embedding threshold, the block 
size and the selected features of the Schur decomposition. The 
extensive tests carried out on the UCID database prove the 
efficacy of the attack to generate high quality unmarked images. 
Therefore, the attack proves that the watermarking algorithms 
based on the Schur decomposition, cannot be used to protect the 
copyright of digital contents. 
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